As the United States Senate debates a tax deal that would restore neutral tax treatment for most research and development (R&D) expenses, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has adopted an aggressive policy to subsidize R&D investment. This puts the U.S. at a disadvantage if it does not fix its own R&D tax system.
Currently, U.S. companies are not able to deduct the full value of their R&D investments due to a provision of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Instead, they are required to amortize (spread deductions out) over the course of five years for domestic R&D and 15 years for foreign R&D. This means U.S. firms are only able to deduct roughly 89 percent of their R&D costs in real terms—and even less if inflation is above 2 percent.
On the other hand, China has pursued a policy known as a super deduction, which allows companies to deduct more than 100 percent of their R&D costs. In 2023, the Chinese expanded their super deduction from 175 percent of R&D costs to 200 percent of R&D costs for most businesses. This amounts to a large subsidy.
Despite the heavy subsidies, China has not overtaken the United States in terms of R&D investment. However, China has reduced the gap with the U.S. in recent decades. In 2019, the U.S. spent $668 billion on R&D, which accounted for 3.1 percent of GDP. The same year, China spent $526 billion in R&D, or 2.2 percent of its GDP.
The U.S. should not necessarily emulate China’s super deduction policy. One risk with such a generous subsidy for R&D is a shift in expense classification. Firms might also reclassify non-R&D expenses as R&D to juice the amount of expenses eligible for the subsidy. Alternatively, the subsidy could end up simply boosting the salaries of already-employed researchers, rather than increasing real research activity.
Nonetheless, penalizing R&D when China has moved to subsidize it so aggressively is a real concern. In 2023, private investment in R&D only grew by 0.8 percent, while overall business investment grew by 4.4 percent—the slowest annual growth in R&D investment since 2012.
The tax deal’s approach to R&D amortization is incomplete, as it reinstates R&D expensing for only two years and for only domestic R&D. Ideally, the tax deal would restore full expensing for U.S. companies’ foreign R&D investment as well. It’s in the interest of U.S. workers for U.S. firms to succeed on the world stage—ultimately, both types of R&D investment are complementary and it makes little sense to penalize outbound R&D investment in the U.S. tax code.
Though providing permanent R&D expensing alone would not be a China-competition magic bullet, it is a no-brainer place to start. In this technological race, we should first make sure we have not tied our own shoes together.
Stay informed on the tax policies impacting you. Subscribe to get insights from our trusted experts delivered straight to your inbox.

